In order to prevent a panic, which might have had the effect of unraveling the entire international financial system, a number of governmental and intergovernmental agencies, led by the United States, stepped in to assure the continued repayment of the Mexican loans. At this same time, the International Monetary Fund IMF emerged as the guarantor of the creditworthiness of developing countries.
The IMF had performed this role in the past, but primarily with regard to its "own" money - that is, money lent by the IMF to assist countries in addressing balance of payments problems. This new emphasis on creating conditions primarily to assure payments to private institutions, while in theory not a new undertaking, was different in character and content from what the IMF had done in the past, largely because of the enormous amount of money involved.
Unfortunately, the IMF, in spite of the unprecedented situation, did not perceive that its responsibilities had changed in any significant way, and gave its seal of approval for additional loans only to those countries that accepted its traditional policies, which are generally referred to as stabilization programs of "structural adjustment. Programs of structural adjustment are designed to address balance of payments problems that are largely internally generated by high inflation rates, large budget deficits, or structural impediments to the efficient allocation of resources, such as tariffs or subsidies.
The IMF structural adjustment programs highlight "productive capacity as critical to economic performance" and emphasize "measures to raise the economy's output potential and to increase the flexibility of factor and goods markets. A further assumption of an IMF stabilization program is that exposure to international competition in investment and trade can enhance the efficiency of local production. In practice, these programs involve reduced food and transportation subsidies, public sector layoffs, curbs on government spending, and higher interest and tax rates.
When one is dealing with a particularly inefficient economic system, structural adjustment is perhaps acceptable medicine; and there were many examples of gross inefficiency, not to mention outright corruption, in many of the countries that were soliciting IMF assistance. In this respect, the IMF programs were probably regarded as the correct approach by the public and private agencies that were being asked to reschedule or roll over loans. But the critical difference between the traditional IMF role and its new role as guarantor of creditworthiness is that the suppression of demand, previously designed to free capital for domestic investment, simply freed capital to leave the country.
Moreover, the approach assumes that it was primarily inefficient economic management in the developing countries that led to the debt crisis. From this point of view, the developing countries had gorged themselves on easy money in the s, with the debt crisis being the rough equivalent of a fiscal hangover. Indeed, according to Stephen Haggard, the IMF believed that a large majority of the failures of adjustment programs were due to "political constraints" or "weak administrative systems," as opposed to external constraints that were largely beyond the control of the developing countries, for example, high interest rates.
It is extraordinarily difficult to determine the validity of this perspective.
Global Debt and Third World Development
Clearly, some loans have been used in inappropriate ways. The assessment of culpability is in some respects crucial and in other respects irrelevant: crucial, because one would like to understand the crisis so that a repetition of a similar crisis can be avoided in the future; irrelevant, because the current situation is so desperate that solutions must be found no matter where the blame for the crisis actually lies.
In the final analysis, blame rests on a system of finance that allowed developing countries and banks to engage in transactions reasonable only in the context of wildly optimistic scenarios of economic growth. Additionally, much blame rests on policies of the United States government that were undertaken with insufficient regard for their international financial implications.
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William Cline attempted to distinguish between the internal and external causes of the debt crisis by looking at figures for the effects of oil price and interest rate increases in order to determine the degree to which each were responsible for the crisis. His figures, reproduced in Table Nonetheless, as a rough approximation, the data suggest that external factors were significantly more important than the internal causes of inefficiency and corruption.
The IMF stabilization programs, with their nearly exclusive emphasis on the internal economic policies of heavily indebted countries and relative disregard for the factors that Cline identifies, have failed to encourage the very type of economic growth that might have helped the developing countries to grow out of their indebtedness. In fact, these programs have had exactly the opposite effect: they have further impoverished many of the heavily indebted countries to a point where their future economic growth must be seriously doubted.
Many observers have come to share Jeffrey Sachs's assessment of structural adjustment programs: "The sobering point is that programs of this sort have been adopted repeatedly, and have failed repeatedly. Source : William R. This failure of traditional techniques to alleviate the debt problem suggests that perhaps the conventional interpretation of the debt crisis is incomplete or misleading.
Indeed, much evidence suggests this inference. Perhaps the most compelling evidence is the fact that periodic debt crises seem to be endemic to the modern international system.
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There have been cycles of debt and default in the past, and some of the same debtors have experienced similar crises in almost regular cycles. This explanation must be supplemented by factors that are more structural and deep-seated. There are at least two issues relatively unexplored by the conventional explanation of the debt crisis that deserve greater attention, and they both relate to the vulnerability of the developing countries to changes in the world economy over which they have little direct control: their sensitivity to monetary changes in the advanced industrialized countries, and their dependence on primary commodities as sources of their export earnings.
The first consideration is perhaps the more dramatic. It is no mere coincidence that the United States experienced its own very serious debt crisis in the same year that panic arose over the external debt of developing countries. Interest rates in the United States had achieved very high levels in , but the inflation rates at the time were also very high. After the deep economic recession of , the inflation rate declined markedly, but the interest rates remained high. In turn, the high interest rates inflated the value of the dollar, reducing U.
The United States, however, did not experience a debt "crisis" because it was able to reassure its creditors that its promises to pay were plausible. But the high real interest rates forced upon the developing countries as their loans were turned over created a situation where no similar guarantees could be offered. As it became obvious that the debtor countries could not meet the increased payments, the private banks tried to pull back, bringing about the very crisis they wished to avoid. Only very persistent efforts by official governmental agencies managed to stabilize the situation enough to avoid a precipitous default.
In a very real sense, however, it was the actions of the United States that created the immediate crisis, and not some event or pattern of events in the developing world itself. Similarly, this debt crisis aggravated an already bad situation with respect to the ability of the developing countries to pay back their loans.
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Many of the developing countries were extremely poor prior to the crisis, which was one reason why they took out such massive debts in the first place. There was no evidence, before , that this condition of relative poverty was changing in any but a few of the developing countries, such as the newly industrializing countries of South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan.
In fact, most of the traditional measures of economic development suggest that most developing countries were falling farther behind the advanced industrialized countries at an increasingly faster rate. The developing countries will always be relatively poorer than the advanced industrialized countries as long as they rely heavily on primary commodities, such as copper and rubber, for export earnings. Trade may be a stimulus to growth, but trade is not an effective way to overcome relative poverty if the values for primary commodities fail to keep pace with the value of manufactured products.
This relationship between the values of manufactured exports and the values of primary commodities exports the terms of trade has been carefully examined by many economists, and some of them, such as Prebisch, have argued that the international division of labor is systematically biased against the interests of countries that rely heavily on the export of primary products. This debate, which has been extended into what has been termed a theory of dependency, is a difficult one to resolve with clear empirical evidence.
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Some recent evidence, however, suggests that raw materials producers have indeed suffered relative economic losses in the twentieth century. Enzo R. Grilli and Maw Cheng Yang analyzed the terms of trade between primary commodities and manufactured goods since and found that "the prices of all primary commodities including fuels relative to those of traded manufactures declined by about 36 percent over the period, at an average annual rate of 0. Thus, the developing countries are at a structural disadvantage compared to the advanced industrialized countries. The newly industrializing countries of East Asia are the exceptions that prove this rule.
Because they have been able to expand manufactured exports, they have improved their relative economic situation tremendously in recent years. Other countries have been less successful, and the recent resurgence of protectionist measures against manufactured products from the developing world will make this type of transition only more difficult. Ultimately, the solution to the debt crisis, and the underlying poverty that spawned it, must address this terms of trade issue.
This imperative will be discussed in further detail below. Clearly, however, the solutions to the debt crisis will require a perspective that looks at the problem as more than a temporary aberration precipitated by bad luck and incompetence. This explosion of debt has had numerous consequences for the developing countries, but this section will focus on only three consequences: the decline in the quality of life within debtor countries, the political violence associated with that decline, and the effects of the decline on the developed world.
The next section of this chapter will explore separately the most publicized cost of the debt crisis, the possibility that it might have instigated a global banking crisis. The first, and most devastating, effect of the debt crisis was, and continues to be, the significant outflows of capital to finance the debt.
According to the World Bank: "Before the highly indebted countries received about 2 percent of GNP a year in resources from abroad; since then they have transferred roughly 3 percent of GNP a year in the opposite direction. This capital hemorrhage has severely limited prospects for economic growth in the developing world and seriously skewed the patterns of economic development within it. The implications for growth are summarized by Table The decline in average growth, from 6. Given the rate of population increase in these countries, a 1.
In other words, the populations of these countries were significantly worse off economically during the period of the debt crisis; and this decline further jeopardizes opportunities for future economic growth given its implications for domestic demand and productive investment. The terms of trade statistics, which reflect the relative movement of export prices to import prices, are similarly grim: developing countries are getting much less in return for their exported products when compared to their costs for imported items.
In short, these countries must export even more of their products in order to maintain current levels of imports. The total effects for the quality of life in the highly indebted countries were summarized by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development:. Per capita consumption in the highly-indebted countries in , as measured by national accounts statistics, was no higher than in the late s; if terms of trade losses are taken into account, there was a decline. Per capita investment has also fallen drastically, by about 40 percent between and It declined steeply during , but far from recovering subsequently, it has continued to fall.
As for the debtor countries, many have fallen into the deepest economic crisis in their histories. Between and real per capita income declined in absolute terms in almost every country in South America. Many countries' living standards have fallen to levels of the s and s.